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The Parts of Definitions, Unity, and
Sameness in Aristotle's Metaphysics
Mark R. Wheeler
First principles (ά ρ χ ά ι) are crucial to Aristotle's
conception of scientific knowledge (ε π ισ τ ή μ η ). In the
Posterior Analytics, Aristotle teaches us that all scientific
knowledge is either knowledge arrived at through
demonstration from first principles or knowledge of the
first principles themselves. The first principles of a given
science are the primary premises (τ oc π ρ ώ τ a ) of that science
(Pst. An., 72a7); they express the essential characteristics
of the substance about which the given science is
concerned; and all other scientific knowledge is derived
from the first principles through syllogistic inference.1
The first principles of the various sciences are
expressed through definition (ο ρ ισ μ ό ς ). More precisely,
the first principle of a science is a definition which provides
an indemonstrable account of the essence (λ ό γ ο ς του τ ί

'On the importance of first principles and demonstration
for Aristotle's philosophy of science, see Michael
Ferejohn’s The Origins o f Aristotelian Science (New Haven;
Yale, 1991) and Richard M cKirahan's Principles and
Proofs: Aristotle's Theory o f Demonstrative Science
(Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1992), especially
chs. 2, 12, and 13.
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έ σ τ ιν α ν α π ό δ ε ικ τ ο ς) of the subject matter of the science.2
Throughout the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle assumes that
such definitions (usually termed "real definitions") are not
only possible but actual, provides explanations for how we
come to possess these definitions, and outlines methods for
stating them clearly. Examples of first principles include
the definition of "man" as "two-footed animal" and the
definition of "arithmetical unit" as "indivisible quantity."
At least two conclusions follow from these considera
tions concerning first principles. First, unless we are in
possession of the first principles of some science, we can
have no scientific knowledge. Second, since we possess a
first principle only if we possess a definition, any problem
which threatens to undermine A ristotle’s theory of
definition is a threat to the project o f Aristotelian science.
In this paper, I investigate a problem for A ristotle's theory
of definition of which Aristotle was fully aware, and I
argue for an interpretation of A ristotle's solution to that
problem which helps, in part, to explain the connections
among Books Zeta, Eta, Theta, and Iota o f the
Metaphysics.

2In Book II chapter 10 of the Posterior Analytics,
Aristotle distinguishes among three different kinds of
definition: (1) definitions which express the meaning of a
term without asserting that there is anything in the world
corresponding to the definition, (2) definitions which
explain through quasi-demonstration why a thing which
exists in the world exists, and (3) definitions which provide
indemonstrable accounts of essences, as apprehended
through intuition (νους). It is the latter of these three kinds
that are of importance here.
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That Aristotle’s analysis of sensible substance in Book
Zeta gives rise to difficulties in connection with his theory
of definition is well known.3 A ristotle's attempt to
reconcile his analysis of sensible substance (ο ύ σ ία ) with his
theory of definition as presented in his other works,
particularly the Posterior Analytics, leads him to reconsider
his account of definitions which express indemonstrable
essences and to consider whether or not, and in what sense,
definitions must include accounts o f the parts of the
.substances being defined.
Initially, at least, the prospect of a successful
reconciliation looks good.
The concept o f sensible
substance is analyzed, and four candidates for primary
substance are acknowledged (Met., 1028b35): the essence
(το τ ί ήν είν α ι), the universal (το κα θόλο υ ), the genus (το
γ έ ν ο ς ), and the subject (τό υ π ο κ είμ εν ο ν ). The latter of
these is then singled out as being in the truest sense
substance, and Aristotle turns to investigation of the
concept of subject. The concept of a subject is analyzed
into its three separate senses (Met., 1029a3): (1) the matter
(ή ύ λ η ), (2) the form (ή μορφή = το ε ίδ ο ς ) , and (3) the
composite of matter and form (το έκ το ύ τω ν [τή ς ύ λ η ς κ α ί
του είδο υ ς]); the form is identified with the essence; and
the claim that the definition is an account of the essence of
some substance is reaffirmed (Met., 1030a8). All o f this

3See Michael Ferejohn's forthcoming "Matter,
Definition, and Generation in A ristotle's Metaphysics" and
his forthcoming "The Definition of Generated Composites
in Aristotle’s Metaphysics," also Michael Frede's "The
Definition of Sensible Substances in Metaphysics Z" in D.
Devereux and P. Pellegrin, edd., Biologie, Logique, et
Métaphysique chez Aristote (Paris 1990), pp. 113-144.
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bodes well for the unity of the Aristotelian project of
explaining scientific knowledge.
Not surprisingly, difficulties soon threaten. Beginning
at Zeta 10, Aristotle raises the following compound
question (Met., 1034b20): Since all definitions are formulae
and all formulae have parts, what are the parts of the
definition and how are the parts o f the definitions related to
the whole? Aristotle answers the first part o f this question
handily by way of the following conclusions (see, for
Aristotle's summary of these points, M et., 1037a21): All
definitions of sensible substances are formulae of essences
which are composed of parts; the only terms included in a
definition of sensible substance are terms which refer to
parts of the essence of the sensible substance (Met.,
1035b34); and no terms which refer to the material parts of
sensible substance are included in the definition of sensible
substance (Met., 1036a9). The remaining part of the
question, however, is not so easily answered.
The question of how the parts of a definition are related
to the whole so as to form a unity is an outstanding
question for Aristotle's theory of definition as presented in
the Posterior Analytics (cf. Pst. An., 93b35). To get at the
fundamental problem as Aristotle understood it, I turn now
to a reconstruction of a reductio ad absurdum Aristotle
constructs on the basis of it. Considerable attention has
been paid to book Zeta chapter 13 of the Metaphysics with
regard to Aristotle's theory of prim ary substances,4 less

4See Alan Code's "No Universal is a Substance: An
Interpretation of Metaphysics Z13, 1038b8-15" in Paidea
(1978), Special Aristotle Issue, pp. 65-74, and Michael
W oods' "Problems in Metaphysics Z, Chapter 13" in
Aristotle: A Collection o f Critical Essays, ed. Julius
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attention has been given to how Zeta 13 bears on A ris
totle's theory of definition. Given the close ties which bind
A ristotle's theory of definition to his theory o f primary
substances, one might think that this is because Zeta 13 has
no bearing on Aristotle’s theory of definition. But, at the
end of Zeta 13, Aristotle presents the following reductio ad
absurdum:
If no substance can consist of universals, because
they mean "of such a kind," and not a particular
thing; and if no substance can actually be composed
[σ ύ ν θ ετο ν ] of substances, every substance will be
incomposite [ά σ ύνθετον], and so there will be no
formula [λ όγος] of any substance. But in point of
fact it is universally held, and has been previously
stated, that substance is the only or chief subject of
definition [ o pov]; but on this showing there is no
definition [ορ ισ μ ό ς] even of substance. Then there
can be no definition of anything; or rather in a
sense there can, and in a sense there cannot. What
this means will be clearer from what follows later.
(Met., 1039al4-23; trans. Tredennick)

M oravcsik, (New York, 1967), pp. 215-238, for discus
sions on these points. The discussion in the secondary
literature focuses on Aristotle's claims concerning the
universality of substance. My arguments here assume that
Aristotle is committed to the claim that primary substance
is a universal of some sort, viz., that the ínfima species
which is predicated of the matter is universal in some sense
of κ α θ ό λ ο υ . I leave to one side whether or not Aristotle is
inconsistent in his full account of substance.
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The first feature of this passage worth noting is Aristotle's
recognition that some of his assumptions concerning sub
stance in the Metaphysics seem to entail that there can be
no definition of substance. But this is of course absurd,
since on all accounts "substance is the only or chief subject
of definition." The second feature o f note is that Aristotle
immediately reassures the reader that all is not lost: At
least in one sense of what he means by "definition," there
can be a definition of substance, and Aristotle promises to
make clear what he means by this in the sequel. Thus,
there are two ways in which Zeta 13 appears to play a
crucial role in our understanding the difficulties confronting
Aristotle's theory of definition in the Metaphysics: First,
he presents in a concise fashion the problem as he sees it;
second, he informs us that the solution to the problem is to
be solved in some part of the Metaphysics following Zeta
13.
Turning now to the problem as Aristotle presents it, I
assume for the moment that none o f the terms in the
passage from Zeta 13 are ambiguous. Appealing to parts
of the Metaphysics and of the Posterior Analytics already
discussed above for Aristotle's implicit assumptions, a
preliminary reconstruction reveals that the following
premises entail the claim that there can be no definition of
substance:
A) All substances are incomposite (ά σ ύ ν θ ε τ α ).
B) All definitions are composite ( σ ύ ν τ ε τ α ) .5

5See, e.g., Met., 1034b20 & 1042a20.
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C) All definitions have the same structure (είδο ς)6 as
that of which they are definitions.7
Premise A follows from the following premises 1-3, each
of which Aristotle accepts:
(I)
No substance can consist o f universals. Here I read
"consist of” as meaning "composed of" in the sense of "has
for parts." Reading "consists of" in this way, the following
reasoning justifies premise 1.
Aristotle is at least
committed to the claim that not all universals are substance.
We know this because qualities and quantities (which are
universals) cannot be ontologically prior to substances, and
the higher genera (also universals) are ontologically
posterior to and dependent upon the species. Thus,

6The crucial passage giving rise to this interpretation of
the relation between the parts o f formulae and the parts of
things is the following:
Έ πει δέ ό ορισμός λόγος έσ τί, τ α δέ λόγος μέρη .
έχει, ώς δέ ό λόγος προς το πράγμα, και τδ μέρος
του λόγου προς το μέρος του πράγματος ομοίως έχει,
άπορειται ήδη πότερον δει τον τω ν μερών λόγον
ένυπάρχειν έν τφ του όλ ο υ λόγω ή ου. (1(Β4ΰ20-24)
One way of understanding A ristotle’s use of είδ ο ς is
"structure." Since the discussion here concerns essences
and essences are, for Aristotle, identified with the species
form (which is another use of " ε ίδ ο ς " ), I have chosen to
render "είδος" as "structure" in connection with the
question of how the parts of λ ό γ ο ι are related to the whole
in the same way that the parts o f the thing are related to the
whole.
7See, e.g.. Met., 1034b21.
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substance cannot have as parts these kinds o f universals
because they cannot exist independently o f substance.
Further, if anything is a substance and is universal in
nature, it is the ínfima species. Let us suppose, as is
reasonable, that primary substance is to be identified with
the ínfima species. The ínfima species are universals of
some sort, so substance might consist of this kind of
substance. But by Zeta 13 of the Metaphysics, Aristotle has
ruled out any candidate for substance other than the matter,
the ínfima species, and the composite of these. Thus,
insofar as substance can consist o f universals, either the
matter must consist of universals, which is false since
matter is indeterminate, or the ínfima species must, which
is false since these are indivisible, or the concrete
individual must, which again is false because the concrete
individual is separable into matter and Ínfima species only
in theory not in the strong sense required. Thus, substance
is not composed of universals in the sense o f Ínfima species
either.
Since qualities (of various categories), quantities and
substances exhaust Aristotle's ontology, no substance
consists of universals.
(2) No substance can be composed o f other substances.
Again, "composed of" here is to be understood in the sense
o f having parts which can exist independently. If substance
= essence, we know the Ínfima species is indivisible. A
fortiori, we know that it cannot be composed o f others of
its ilk. If substance = matter, it is clear that matter is not
composed of substances for Aristotle. If substance =
concrete individual, the concrete individual insofar as it is
a substance is not composed of parts which can exist
independently.
(3) I f no substance can be composed o f other substances
and no substance can consist o f universals, then every
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substance is incomposite. Either something is a substance
or a universal. If substances are not composed o f either
substances or universals, then they are not composed o f
anything. If substances are not composed of anything, then
they are incomposite.
A) Every substance is incomposite.
(ffl) No substance is composite.
Premise B «fe C and an additional assumption, each o f
which Aristotle accepts, entail the following conclusion #2:
(a) AH formulae are composite. [Met., 1034b20, 1042a20]
(b) Nothing composite has the same structure as something
incomposite.
(c) All formulae have the same structure as the things o f
which they are formulae, [e.g., Met., 1034b21]
(d) All definitions are formulae.

(#2) All definitions are definitions of composite things.
Aristotle remains committed to some version of all three
of these assumptions throughout the Metaphysics, but he
also believes he can consistently maintain that there are
definitions o f substance. Aristotle avoids this apparent
inconsistency by showing that each of the premises À-C
contains an ambiguous term. Aristotle's solution depends
upon recognizing the ambiguity of four terms contained in
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premises A-C: "substance," "composite," "same," and
"definition." By Zeta 13, Aristotle has narrowed the
problem down to disambiguating the various senses o f the
term "definition," and it is a distinction in the senses of
"definition" which Aristotle introduces in subsequent parts
of the Metaphysics in order to solve his problem. Before
presenting my interpretation of how Aristotle resolves the
problem, I will clarify the meanings of the important terms
contained in the premises.
Aristotle's claims concerning definitions in the passage
from Zeta 13 are to be understood in the sense we have
been working with all along, viz., an indemonstrable
account of the essence. Prior to this point in Zeta,
Aristotle has distinguished among a number of different
candidates for definitions and has narrowed the field
considerably. Definitions of the concrete particular and
definitions of the matter, as well as definitions o f qualities,
quantities and accidental compounds, have been dismissed
by Aristotle before Zeta 13 as being only of secondary
import. (For Aristotle's explicit rejections of the former
kinds of definitions see Met. 1036a and 1037a26
respectively, for the latter kinds see Met., 1 0 30al2.).8

8Among the possible kinds of definitions of substance,
Aristotle countenances three, each of which corresponds to
a kind of substance investigated in the Metaphysics: (1)
definition of the matter, (2) definition of the essence, and
(3) definition of the concrete individual which is the
combination of matter and essence. Aristotle cannot allow
for definitions of matter if "matter" is understood in the
way Aristotle explicates it prior to Zeta 13 as that which is
"neither a particular thing nor a quantity nor designated by
any of the categories which define Being" (Met., 1029a20).
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W hen he uses the term "substance" in Zeta 13, Aristotle
is talking about either the matter, the concrete particular or
the essence. Aristotle is clearly concerned with sensible
substance in the middle books of the Metaphysics. Given

One simply cannot define that which falls under none of the
categories which define Being. Later, in Book Eta,
Aristotle again talks of definitions of matter, but his
discussion there concerns the definitions proposed by other
philosophers and does not bear on his conclusions in Zeta.
Aristotle does not allow for definitions of concrete
individuals. Aristotle does not demonstrate in full the
impossibility of definitions of concrete individuals until
Zeta 15, and this fact has lead at least one commentator,
Tredennick, to conclude that this sense of definition was
still in the running at Zeta 13. Two things make this
reading untenable. First, Aristotle had already discounted
this kind o f definition of substance prior to Zeta 13 and had
presented his reasons for doing so (see Zeta 11 and 12,
especially 1036a5). Furthermore, Zeta 15 is part of a
polemic against the Platonist conception of substantial
Forms understood as concrete individuals which Aristotle
began at Zeta 14; as such, the rehearsing of the arguments
for the impossibility of definitions of concrete particulars in
Zeta 15 is best understood as supporting A ristotle's attack
on the Platonist position.
These considerations lead to the conclusion that by Zeta
13 Aristotle has ruled out every kind of definition except
for definitions of the essence.
This contention is
strengthened by the fact that Aristotle has asserted, in many
places prior to Zeta 13 that real definitions are the primary
and unqualified kind of definition of substance (see, e.g ..
M et., 1030b5).

j

j
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that Aristotle has concluded that there can be in no sense
definitions of the matter or of the concrete particular and
given that Aristotle has argued, prior to Zeta 13, that the
essence is substance in the primary sense of the term, it
seems clear Aristotle is referring to the essence of sensible
substance when he puzzles over the connection between
definitions and substance in Zeta 13.
In virtue of what has been said, we can restate the three
assumptions listed above:
A') All essences (τ cc τ ί ή v ε ί v a i) of sensible substances
are incomposite (ά σ ύ ν θ ε τ α ) .
B') All definitions are composite (σ ύ ν θ ε τ α ).
C ) All definitions have the same structure (ε ίδ ο ς) as
the essences (τ α τ ί ή ν ε ί ν α ι ) of which they are
definitions.
We can likewise reconstrue A ristotle's proposed solution to
the problem in the following way: In one sense of "defi
nition," there can be no definition o f the essence of sensible
substances; in another sense, there can be definitions of the
essence of sensible substances.
Having clarified the relevant senses of "substance" and
of "definition" in the above premises, I will now focus on
some other problematic terms in the premises. Premise A ’
contains the terms "essence" (τ ο τ ί ή ν ε ί ν α ι) and
"incomposite" (ά σ ύ ν θ ετα ). While not pretending to provide
a detailed analysis of Aristotelian essences, I can make
some remarks sufficient for my purposes here. In the
Metaphysics, essences of sensible substances are the
primary substances of the sensible world; that is to say,
they are the ontologically fundamental constituents of the
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Aristotelian sensible universe. Each essence o f a sensible,
substance is its form (e.g., the essence of man is the form
that all men exhibit, which form is an Ínfima species o f the
genus animal), certain groups of essences are grouped
together into classes called "genera" (e.g., the ¿ssence o f
man, the essence of dog and the essence of cat can be
grouped together under the genus "animal"), and essences
are types of which there must be tokens (e.g., Aristotle was
a token of the type man).
This last claim, which is
somewhat controversial, is particularly important for my
discussion here. In claiming that essences o f sensible
substances must have tokens, I am assuming that the
essences of sensible substances cannot exist separately from
the concrete individuals of which they are the essences.
There cannot be an essence of man unless there is at least
one concrete particular which is a combination o f the
essence o f man and the matter appropriate to man. This
assumption is well supported by what Aristotle asserts in
chapter Zeta; for example,
Is there then some sphere besides the particular
spheres, or some house besides the bricks? Surely
no individual thing would ever have been generated
if form had existed thus independently. (Met.,
1033b21; trans. Tredennick)
A consequence of this view is that the essences o f sensible
substances cannot exist separately from matter.
Aristotle asserts that the essences of sensible substances
áre incomposite (ά σ ύ ν θ ε τ α ). Plato used ά σ υν θ ε τ ά in the
Phaedo (78c) in connection with composite objects and
natural compounds, and the thrust of the discussion there is
to distinguish things which can be broken up into parts, and
things such as the soul which cannot be so dispersed.
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Likewise in the Theaetetus, Plato refers to the primary
elements o f which other things are composed as
incomposite (ά σ ύ ν θ ε τ α ). Aristotle adopts Plato's use of
ά σ ύ ν θ ε τ α in connection with part-whole relations.
Aristotle discusses various part-whole ( μ έ ρ ο ς - ό λ ο ς )
relations in Book Delta, chapter 25, of the Metaphysics A
but it will suffice here to consider two of these. The first
kind of part-whole relation obtains between things ( τ ά δ ε
τ ι) which are divisible into parts which are themselves
individual things ( τ ό δ ε τ ι). The second kind of part-whole
relation obtains between a form (το ε ίδ ο ς) and its
constituent parts (parts which are not themselves individual
things (ά νευ του ποσού). In what follows, I refer to the first
kind of part-whole relation as the aggregate conception, and
the second as the essential conception.
Premise B' concerns definitions and asserts that all
definitions have parts. This is a corollary of A ristotle's
claim, made in various places, that all formulae have parts,
(see, e.g .. Met., 1034b20, 1042a20) It is sufficient in this
context to state that the parts of formulae and, hence, o f
definitions are nouns (see De Int.). Aristotle uses λ ό γ ο ς to
refer variously to either linguistic entities (usually termed
"accounts"), conceptual entities, or essences themselves.
While disentangling these different uses of λ ό γ ο ς may be
important for other reasons, I do not believe that these
considerations have any bearing on the arguments devel
oped here. For ease in exposition, I will render λ ό γ ο ς in
the sense of a linguistic account in what follows.
All definitions are formulae of essences. Aristotle states
that the formula of the essence is the formula composed of
the ultimate differentia and its primary genus (see, e.g .,
Met., 1038a5, 1038al9 and 1038a25). The ultimate
differentia (e.g., rational) and the primary genus (e.g.,
animal) constitute the parts of the definition (e.g., of man).
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Thus, definitions satisfy Aristotle's requirement that all
formulae have parts, and we can restate premise B' to read
"All definitions are composed of the ultimate differentia and
its primary genus."
Premise C is derived from the following passage
concerning definitions and formulae:
Since a definition is a formula, and every formula
has parts; and since the formula is related to the
thing in the same way as the part of the formula to
the part of the thing, the question now arises; Must
the formula of the parts be contained in the formula
of the whole, or not? (Met., 1034b20-24; trans.
Tredennick)
While this passage explains in full neither how formulae are
related to the things of which they are formulae nor how
the parts of formulae are related to the parts of things to
which they refer, Aristotle does present here a
compositional account of the relation whereby insofar as
formulae are related to things so too the parts of formulae
are related to the parts of things. Using Aristotle's
example at M et., 1043al3ff., in the formula for a house
there will be a part referring to the matter of a house
(stones, bricks, and wood) and a part referring to the
essence of a house (a receptacle for retaining goods and
bodies). From this we can plausibly conclude that, insofar
as a formula taken as a whole is related to something, the
parts of the formula must likewise be related to the parts of
the thing. Since this constraint concerns the relation of
parts of formulae with parts of things, it can be construed
as a relation between the structures of formulae and the
structures of things.
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Turning now to discuss Aristotle's concept of
"sameness" as explicated in the Metaphysics, anything
which is the same as something else is in some sense one
with that other thing. Aristotle distinguishes among four
different kinds of oneness: numerical oneness, formal
oneness, generic oneness, and analogical oneness (Met.,
1016b30ff.). Two things are numerically one just in case
they cannot be distinguished materially. For example in the
Odyssey, Odysseus and Noman are numerically one
because their material composition cannot be distinguished.
Two things are formally one just in case their real
definitions cannot be distinguished. For example, any two
people are formally the same because the real definition for
human beings applies to them both. Two things are
generically one just in case they are both subsumed under
one genus.9 For example, a cat and a mouse are generi
cally one because they are both species of the genus
"animal." Finally, two things are analogically one just in
case one stands in relation to something as the other stands
in relation to yet a fourth. Aristotle’s way of putting this
at 1016b35 seems somewhat strange at first, but upon
closer inspection his account accords with our usual
understanding of analogy. Aristotle claims that two things
are analogically the same if they stand in a relation to each
other as a third thing does to a fourth. We typically think
of analogy in terms of relational sameness. Thus, the
relation between the soul and the body is analogous to the
relation between a pilot and his ship; the soul and the
captain are said to have analogous roles. A ristotle's
formulation would have this relation expressed in something

’Aristotle claims that genera are one in a way similar
to the way in which matter is one (Met., 1016a25).
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like the following way: The captain and the soul are
analogously the same because the captain is to the soul as
the ship is to the body. While perhaps strange for us, the
idea captured is identical.10
Again reworking the premises, we get:
A ") All essences of sensible substance are incomposite.

l0If we wish to think of the sameness relation or the
oneness relation as a two-place relation asserting the
identity (understood the way we typically understand it) of
its relata, then we can understand Aristotle's distinctions
among the four senses of sameness and oneness in the
following way: (1) If two things are asserted to be
numerically the same or numerically one, then this is
equivalent to saying that the matter of the former is
identical with the matter o f the latter; (2) If two things are
asserted to be formally the same, then this is equivalent to
saying that the essence of the former is identical with the
essence of the latter ; and like transformations apply for the
generic and analogical species of sameness and oneness.
Note that in going from the Aristotelian formulation to the
formulation in terms of identity, the relata may change.
For example, it makes perfect sense for Aristotle to claim
that Socrates is formally the same as Callias, but it would
be incorrect to claim that Socrates is identical with Callias.
Rather if the relation of formal sameness obtains between
Socrates and Callias, then the essence of Socrates is
identical with the essence of Callias. The relata in the case
of the formal sameness relation are Socrates and Callias,
but in the case of the identity relation, the relata are their
respective essences.
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B” ) All definitions are composed of the term referring
to an ultimate differentia and the term referring to a
primary genus.
C " ) All definitions have the same structure as the
essences of which they are definitions.

These four premises still apparently entail the conclusion
that there can be no definitions of substance, but on the
basis of this last reconstruction Aristotle's problem now can
be stated clearly. All definitions are composite, while all
essences are incomposite. The structures of definitions
must be the same as the structures of those things o f which
they are formulae, viz. essences. So, either Aristotle can
explain how a formula which is composite can have the
same structure as an essence which is incomposite, or he
must reject one of his assumptions. I will now argue that
Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds o f definitions, of
which one has a structure which is analogously the same as
the structure of the essence to which it refers.
It was stated that definitions are formulae composed of
the ultimate differentia and the primary genus. In what
sense of "composite" (σ ύ ν θ ετα ) are definitions separable
into parts for Aristotle? One possible alternative is that
definitions are divisible into independently existing,
meaningful conceptual parts, viz., the ultimate differentia
and the primary genus. This would be to attribute the
aggregate view of the part-whole relation to the structure o f
definitions, and this is the sense in which Aristotle believes
that the Platonists conceive of their definitions; for on
Aristotle's reading of the Platonist position, every
meaningful concept involved in a Platonic division is
independently meaningful and can stand alone as a concept
in virtue of its referring to a corresponding substance, viz.,

The Parts o f Definitions

141

its Form (see Zeta 15). For example, the concept of
animal was meaningful because it referred to the Form of
animalness. The Platonist had posited these independently
existing substances, at least in part, to secure a fixed
meaning for our language and concepts. Each term in the
Platonist definition would be meaningful in virtue of some
corresponding substantial Form which is its semantic
ground. Thus on the Platonist account, it would be
possible for the primary genus, animal, to be a meaningful
concept even if all concrete particular instances o f animals
went our of existence; for, it refers to its own universal
substance, viz., the Form of animalness. Like considera
tions apply to all other meaningful concepts for the Plato
nist. Aristotle's arguments from Zeta 13 through Zeta 16
can be understood, in part, as attempts to refute this
Platonic conception of the parts of definitions by under
mining the claim that any universal is a substance in the
way that Aristotle understands the Platonic Forms to be
substances; having shown by means of these arguments that
no such universal substances can exist, Aristotle believes he
has effectively removed the semantic ground for the Pla
tonic conception of language and concepts.
Having argued against the Platonist’s conception
definition, Aristotle turns to his alternative conception, a
project which takes him beyond book Zeta into Books Eta,
Theta, and Iota.
■
Aristotle introduced the concept o f matter in order to
deal with certain metaphysical problems concerning changes
o f sensible substances. In working out the epistemological
presuppositions of his theory of sensible substance in the
Metaphysics, Aristotle was forced to incorporate his
distinction between matter and essence into his theory o f
definition as proposed in the Posterior Analytics.
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In Zeta 11, Aristotle had rejected the claim that terms
referring to the material parts of sensible substances were
to be included in the formula of the essence; he also
rejected the claim that there was a formula of the matter.
The material parts were not included because they were not
a part o f the essence of the sensible substance, and the
definition was of the essence; and there could be no
definition of the matter, since matter was indeterminate.
Nevertheless, Aristotle recognizes in Zeta 11 that to
expunge reference to the matter of sensible substances from
definitions of sensible substances would be a mistake, since
the material nature of sensible substance is one of its
essential characteristics.
Hence to reduce everything in this way and to
dispose of the matter is going too far . . . For the
animal is sensible and cannot be defined without
motion, and hence not unless its parts are in some
definite condition; for it is not a hand in any
condition that is a part of a man, but only when it
can perform its function. (Mel., 1036b22-23,28-31;
trans. Tredennick)
Aristotle puts off his investigation into how the material
aspect o f sensible substance is to be accommodated in the
definition until Zeta 12 where he takes up the question in
connection with the method of division.
According to Aristotle, either the primary genus
absolutely does not exist as a meaningful concept
independently of its ultimate differentiae or the primary
genus exists is a meaningful concept only insofar as it
refers to the proximate matter.
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If then, the genus absolutely does not exist apart
from the species which it includes, or if it exists,
but only as matter (for speech is genus and matter,
and the differentia make the species, i.e., the
letters, out of it), obviously the definition is the
formula composed of the differentiae. (Met.,
1038a6; trans. Tredennick)
In the first case, Aristotle alludes to his doctrine in the
Categories (2b5ff.) according to which all genera are
ontologically dependent upon their infitna species, which in
turn are ontologically dependent upon the particulars which
they subsume. On this reading, the term referring to the
primary genus would fail to refer if all of its subordinate
species ceased to exist. For example, "anim ar would fail
to refer if all of the various species of animals went out of
existence. In the second case, Aristotle suggests the
doctrine presented in Book Eta chapter 6 where he
identifies the primary genus with the proximate matter and
the ultimate differentia with the form. The crucial passage
comes at Met. 1045al5:
What is it, then, that makes "man" one thing, and
why does it make him one thing and not many, e.g.
"anim ar and "two-footed," especially if, as some
say, there is an Idea of "animal" and an Idea of
"two-footed"? . . . But if, as we maintain, man is
part matter and part form—the matter being
potentially, and the form actually man—, the point
we are investigating will no longer seem to be a .
difficulty. For this difficulty is just the same as we
should have if the definition o f X were "round
bronze"; for this name would give a clue to the
formula; . . . The difficulty is no longer apparent,
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because the one is matter and the other form, (trans.
Tredennick)

Aristotle is here talking about the definition of "man" as
"two-footed animal" and claims that the parts of the
definition "two-footed" and "animal" are essential parts of
the definition, one of which refers to the formal aspect of
the essence of the sensible substance man and the other to
the material aspect. As he goes on to claim, with regard to
the definitions of sensible substance, "part of the formula
is always matter and part actuality" (Met., 1045a35). It is
crucial to note here that Aristotle claims that both essences
of sensible substance and definitions of sensible substances
involve a part which is material, i.e., potentiality, and part
which is actuality; the case of man is intended as an
instance of this general claim.
This has important
ramifications for our reconstruction o f the problem in Zeta
13, for now it becomes clear that premise A ” needs to be
reevaluated.
Premise A " asserts that all essences of sensible
substances are incomposite (ά σ ύ ν θ ετα ). It now appears that
the essences of sensible substances are composite in that
they involve parts one of which is actuality and one of
which is potentiality. Has Aristotle thus rescinded his
claim made in Zeta 13? No. It is still the case that the
essences are incomposite, if by incomposite we mean the
aggregate conception of the part-whole relation. It is this
Platonic sense of the composite nature o f sensible
substances which Aristotle denies in Zeta 13, and it is
against this conception of the composite nature o f sensible
substances that the arguments in Zeta 14-16 are directed.
Once the parts of the sensible substance are explained in
terms of actuality and potentiality, Aristotle can adopt a
revised premise A” ', which can be expressed as follows:
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A '" ) All essences of sensible substances are composed
of a part which is potentiality and a part which is
actuality.
Aristotle incorporates the material aspect o f the essence
o f sensible substances into the definitions of sensible
substances by identifying it with the primary genus of the
sensible substance. If the primary genus refers to the
proximate matter, then Aristotle is committed to the claim
that the primary genus is potentially some substance (e.g..
De An. 412bl0ff.). For example, if the proximate matter
of a human being, viz., flesh and bones, lacks the essence
of human being, viz., soul, then that proximate matter does
not possess any definite nature, any life (Met., 1036b32).
The primary genus "animal" refers to the proximate matter
which is potentially a human being; the matter is, in this
instance, only homonymously called "human." On the
other hand, if the proximate matter of a human being is
informed by a soul, then the primary genus "animal" again
refers to the proximate matter; but in this case, in virtue of
the essence which informs the proximate matter and which
makes it actually a human being, thè genus is a part of the
definition of the essence of that human being.
Conversely, with regard to sensible substances and as
was noted above, the essence cannot exist separately from
the proximate matter. Unless the requisite matter is
present, there can be no instantiation o f the actuality of
man. Aristotle discusses this reciprocal dependence of
proximate matter and essence in terms of potentiality and
actuality. The essences of sensible substances are the
actualities of sensible substances, while the proximate
materials of sensible substances are the potentialities of
sensible substances. This is, in part, the import of
Aristotle's investigations in Book Theta into actuality and
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potentiality for his doctrine of sensible substance and his
theory o f definition.
These considerations lead to the following revised
premise B " ’:
B '" ) All definitions are composed of a term referring
to the actuality of the sensible substance (viz., ultimate
differentia) and a term referring to the proximate matter
o f the sensible substance (viz., the primary genus).
W e must still determine how the parts of the definition so
construed enable Aristotle to claim that the structure of a
definition is the same as the structure of the essence of the
sensible substance to which it refers. But putting the
various premises together, the prospect for resolving the
problem now appears, for the second time, good:
A ’ " ) All essences of sensible substances are composed
of a part which is potentiality and a part which is
actuality.
B '" ) All definitions are composed of a term referring
to the actuality of the sensible substance (viz., ultimate
differentia) and a term referring to the potentiality of
the sensible substance (viz., the primary genus).
C ” ) All definitions have the same structure as the
essences of which they are definitions.
At 1043b29, Aristotle claims that there can be definition
only o f substances which essentially involve a combination
of actuality and potentiality, viz., sensible substances or
intelligible substances, and he argues against the claim that
there can be definitions of substances which are either pure
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actuality or pure potentiality.
He argues for these
conclusions on the basis of premise C " , claiming that the
defining formula denotes something predicated o f
something, and this must be partly of the nature of matter
and partly o f the nature of form. Immediately following
this discussion, he compares the unity (εν) of numbers with
the unity (ε v) of definitions. Numbers, Aristotle claims, are
substances in the same way that sensible substances are
substances, i.e ., the account of their unity essentially
involves both actuality and potentiality.
Just as when any element which composes the number
is subtracted or added, it is no longer the same number
but a different one, however small the subtraction or
addition is; so neither the definition nor the essence will
continue to exist if something is subtracted from or
added to it. And a number must be something in virtue
of which it is a unity...And the definition is a
unity.. .each substance is a kind of actuality and nature.
(Met., 1043b36-1044a3, 5-6, 9; trans. Tredennick)
Just as some o f Aristotle's contemporaries had argued that
the unity o f a definition could be explained in terms o f
aggregation, so also had some argued that the unity o f
number was explainable in terms of aggregation (cf.· M et.,
1041M0 and Plato's Theatetus 202Aff.). . Since the
definition of sensible substance involves parts, one might
argue that the unity of the definition consists in the
aggregation of the parts, and it is this suggestion that
Aristotle wishes to confute, recognizing that this conception
of definition allows for such things as the Iliad to count as
a definition. The success of Aristotle’s refutation of the
aggregate conception of the unity of definition turns on his
account of the unity of an actuality or kind of nature.
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In marshaling his argument against the claim that the
unity o f definition is to be understood in terms of aggregate
conception of the part-whole relation, Aristotle claims that
there is a sense o f unity (εν ) which explains the unity o f
numbers, definitions, and essences. Aristotle had presented
his analysis o f the concept of unity in Book Delta (se e .
above), but he returns to this analysis in Book Iota, and it
is there that we find Aristotle's explanation of the unity of
sensible substance, definition, and number in terms of the
essential conception of the part-whole relation. Aristotle
distinguishes between two similar questions "What sort of
things are called one (εν)?" and "What is essential unity (τ 6
έ ν ι ε ί ν α ι ) , and what is the formula?" The former
question he takes himself to have answered in Book Delta.
The latter question (the question of the moment) differs
from the first question, according to Aristotle, in that the
first concerns how the term (ό νο μ α ) "one" is used while the
second question concerns the denotation (δ ύ ν α μ ις ) of the
term. Aristotle answers the second question as follows:
To be one (το έ ν ι ε ί ν α ι) is to be indivisible (το
ά δ ια ι ρ έ τ ω έ σ τ ίν ) (being essentially a particular thing,
distinct and separate in place or form or thought), or to
be whole and indivisible; but especially to be the first
measure of each kind (τδ μ έ τ ρ φ ε ίν α ι π ρ ώ τω έκαστου
γένο υ ς κ α ί κ υ ρ ιώ τ α τ α τοΰ ποσού). (Met., 1052Μ6-19,
loosely following Tredennick)
The nature of unity must be the same for all categories.
(Met., 1053b24, trans. Tredennick)
From these passages we can derive a number of germane
conclusions. All essences are unities because they are the
indivisible units of their respective kinds, distinctive in
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form. Likewise, all definitions are unities because they are
the indivisible units, the Ínfima species composed o f the
ultimate differentia and die primary genus, of their
respective conceptual hierarchies (see Zeta 12 for
Aristotle's claims on this point). Essences are indivisible
in the sense that they consist of parts which are not
themselves individual things (one is pure actuality and the
other pure potentiality), but they are divisible into parts
corresponding to the actuality and the potentiality of the
sensible substance. Likewise, definitions are not divisible
into parts which themselves refer to individual things (one
refers to the actuality and the other to the potentiality of
some essence, neither of which is an individual thing), but
they are divisible into parts corresponding to the concepts
referring to the actuality and the potentiality.
Thus we come to the resolution o f the problem raised
at the end of Zeta 13. The structure o f a definition of
substance is analogously the same as the structure o f an
essence of sensible substance because the definition is to the
de se category of substance what the essence o f sensible
substance is to the de re category of substance. Or, to put
it in a more Aristotelian formulation, a definition of
sensible substance is analogously the same as an essence of
sensible substance because they are related in the same way
that the de se category of substance is related to the de re
category of substance.
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